Crime: Perception and Reality
May 9, 2002

By Henry J. Stern

 
    The most important achievement of the eight-year Giuliani administration was the reduction of crime in New York City by more than half.  But, like cockroaches, criminals keep coming back and the city, its people and its reputation are always at risk either when the crime rate increases, or a particularly ghastly crime occurs.

    In recent weeks, there have been a number of well-publicized homicides, rapes and escapes from police and corrections custody.  It may be that these crimes now receive more attention than they did previously because they are fewer in number, but the result has been to heighten public sensitivity and concern in this area.

    In two recent cases, one involving a bus driver, assailants lost their knives in a struggle and were stabbed to death by their intended victims.  Although these cases may leave people with a certain sense of relief at the outcome, they do not contribute to anyone’s sense of security, since most of us are not able to wrestle for knives.

    On most occasions, however, the victim is the intended, or unintended, target of violence.  Even the phrase ‘innocent bystander’ suggests that if the perpetrator killed or injured the person he meant to, the victim may not have been so innocent.

    It may be that, since there is now so much less crime in New York City than there was ten years ago, the press has more space to report particular crimes than they once did.  Homicide, for example, is now treated more as news than as an ordinary occurrence.  In 1990, there were 2245 murders in New York City; in 2001 there were 642, a reduction that exceeds 71% in eleven years.  Remarkably, the 2002 figures show an additional 17% reduction in homicide.

    Press coverage depends to some extent on the location of the crime.  A murder on Park Avenue will receive greater attention if it occurs below 96th Street.  So crime reporting is not directly proportional to the amount of crime. This can create a public impression that crime is rising, when it may not be.  In the old days, ‘crime waves‘ were used by some newspapers from time to time as circulation boosters.

     The police have also been troubled by such incidents as the drunken driving of former Police Officer Joseph Gray, who killed four people in Brooklyn on August 4, 2001 and Captain James O’Connor, who killed a worker on the Bronx Whitestone Bridge on October 20, 1999, while returning from a party in a bar celebrating his promotion.  The cases were treated quite differently; Gray resigned from the force to avoid departmental proceedings which could have jeopardized his pension.  He was later convicted of manslaughter.  O’Connor has continued to draw his police salary, and has not yet been brought to trial, in part because of adjournments secured by his attorney.  Why the difference in treatment between the two officers?  It should be noted that Commissioner Kelly has only served since January 2002.

    Perhaps the most important policy change that Commissioner Kelly has made has been the abolition of the Street Crimes Unit.  It is not easy to judge this issue.  There is a solid argument in having police work in precincts, under the jurisdiction of local commanders.  But there is merit in having an elite, mobile force which can be assigned as needed to different areas, and may have special training.  That is why we have United States Marines, Special Forces teams, and Navy Seals.  Both Commissioner Kelly and the man who first appointed him Police Commissioner, are former marines who are considered marines for life.

    The Street Crimes Unit was held responsible for the tragic shooting of Amadou Diallo in 1997, and its mode of operations was revised after that awful event.  Whether its officers will be equally effective if they are split up in local precincts is not easy to predict; it probably depends on how wisely they are used, which will vary from precinct to precinct.

    But the appearance of the decision is that a major crime-fighting strategy has been abandoned.  Will this be read by the public, or by criminals, as indicating a let-up in the war on crime, for which constant vigilance is required?

    Another symbolic change lies in the public personalities of the two mayors, Giuliani and Bloomberg.  The new mayor is perceived as kinder and gentler than the former mayor.  He does not publicly denounce people, even when they disagree with him.  He speaks softly, but he does carry a big stick.  Mayor Giuliani had a visceral hatred of crime, which he frequently demonstrated.  Mayor Bloomberg probably feels the same way, but he has to demonstrate that to the public, by words and deeds.  The mayor should be seen by the general public, and by potential criminals, as a sworn enemy of evildoers, personally involving himself in the constant struggle for law and order, working on new strategies to control and reduce crime, and monitoring their effectiveness.  The first duty of a leader is to assure the physical safety of his people.

    The importance of an aggressive war on crime, and all the deviant behavior that leads to it, nurtures it, and surrounds it, cannot be underestimated.  In the language of this sad year, one can think of crime as retail terrorism.  For the city to be a suitable place for people to live, work and raise children, it must be safe and perceived as safe.  It is incumbent on City Hall and the police to build on the gains of the last years to reach this goal, and to promote the accurate perception that New York is a safe city as well as a glorious one.

Henry J. Stern is the director of NYCivic.